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A SOCIOLOGICAL COMMENT ON KANT’S CONCEPT 
OF MATURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF PAST HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS  
This brief essay emphasizes the need for scholarly debate on the legacy of Kant’s ideas of 
maturity and on social approaches to past human rights violations. In light of arguments 
presented here, there are strong links between these two issues, as well as important mu-
tual contributions. Kant’s ideas on maturity make one think that reckoning past human 
rights violations is an important component of large-scale social enlightenment and is 
a process of social maturation. On the other hand, debates and analyses of social ap-
proaches to the past demonstrate that social values and emotions play an important role in 
this mostly cognitive process. In fact, purely cognitive enlightenment is neither possible 
nor sufficient when looking the most difficult facts square in the face. The very decision 
to review the past, as well as the decision to avoid difficult issues, is linked with funda-
mental values and with strong popular emotions. The experiences of post-totalitarian and 
post-dictatorial societies can make a contribution to the development of fundamental con-
cepts. 
“To look one’s own history in the face is as much an obligation for nations as it is for 
individuals. Amnesia is a tragedy; self-imposed amnesia is a serious offense.” 
Jacques Le Goff, Geschichte und Gedächtnis (1992) 
“The singular, explosive, incalculable political power of living within the truth resides 
in the fact that living openly within the truth has an ally, invisible to be sure, but omni-
present: this hidden sphere of authentic existence. It is from this sphere that life lived 
openly in the truth grows; it is to this sphere that it speaks and in it that it finds under-
standing. This is where the potential for communication exists… Living within the truth is 
humanity’s revolt against an enforced position, is… an attempt to regain control over 
one’s own sense of responsibility.” 
Vaclav Havel, The Power of the Powerless (1985) 
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1. These quotes – from a historian and a dissident-turned-president, respectively 
– point to a long tradition in European intellectual history, to the Enlightenment. 
It represents, in Immanuel Kant’s words, “... the exit of man from self-incurred 
immaturity” (1961/1784) and consists in the obligation of looking history in the 
face and taking responsibility for it. The twentieth century added new and dra-
matic dimensions to Kant’s idea. Thus, these two quotes point to the dramatic 
experiences of modern societies, to gross human rights violations, and to the 
obligation of looking victims and perpetrators who are living among us in the 
face. The authors of these passages entreat us to explore the truth about the past 
as a condition of authentic communication in our modern democratic society. 
They warn us against the temptation to forget history, to silence it, to relegate it 
to archives, and limit it to scholarly investigations, or, at best, to discuss it in 
narrow circles of experts. Reckoning the past and learning the truth about it 
could expose the ‘other’, who is also ‘us’. It could challenge our identity and 
self-definition as ‘victims’ and ‘virtuous heroes’, and not perpetrators or col-
laborators, and certainly not cowards. Thus, learning the truth could be a healing 
experience; it could reveal a deep and consciously concealed evil. It potentially 
represents a moment of courageous enlightenment, of large-scale social educa-
tion in the process of communication about crimes that have been committed. 
On the other hand, concealing the past and silencing uncomfortable voices en-
ables us to protect feelings of innocence and at the same time reveals intellectual 
or emotional immaturity. 
Although the “exit from immaturity” through independent and free commu-
nication about crimes committed in the past is possible, it might be very diffi-
cult. It depends on the mundane experiences of ordinary citizens and the every-
day rules of social communication, on deeply-rooted, residual structures of 
thinking about justice, crime, guilt, and punishment, not to mention the power 
relations and vested interests of those who would prefer to remain hidden and 
silence the past. Because the truth about the past is very much wrapped up with 
everyday definitions of situation and with the experiences of ordinary people – 
for instance, in the form of the long-term and close coexistence of victims and 
perpetrators. It is at the same time a truth about everyday opportunism, coward-
ice, the toleration of human rights abuses, or, on the contrary, about the civil 
courage of ordinary people, those unsung heroes of world history. And so, pub-
lic debate about past human rights violations and the ways in which people 
“come to terms” with them reflects the varying experiences of victims and their 
families, of perpetrators, collaborators, and instigators, of simple cowards, as 
well as of techniques for justifying and legitimizing past wrongs, because they 
justify the behavior of those persons. We are dealing here with a complex truth 
that emerges from the investigation of these diverse experiences. When facing 
their difficult pasts, post-totalitarian societies find new ways of avoiding diffi-
cult truths, of blurring the line between victims and perpetrators living in the 
same society, of protecting their immaturity, or, on the contrary, they undertake 
efforts to learn about the everyday courageous acts of ordinary people and be-
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come able to demythologize their public consciousness. Therefore, social reck-
oning of the past in the form of public debate and the institutionalization of the 
search for truth represents, to use an apt formulation of Zygmunt Bauman, 
“a moral moment” in the lives of contemporary pluralistic and complex societies 
that stirs public consciousness and makes people think in terms of good and evil 
(Bauman, 1988). However, the public education in an enlightened debate and 
the formation of the moral ability to think in such terms encounter new barriers 
or impediments that make it possible to avoid difficult issues and to remain cog-
nitively and emotionally immature.  
In this brief presentation devoted to the legacy of Kant’s ideas about matur-
ity, after briefly outlining the debate on maturity as intellectual and emotional 
emancipation, and indeed as a process of learning how to live within the truth 
after the everyday experiences of totalitarianism, I will briefly describe the in-
terests and arguments of the social sciences in the debate on reckoning past hu-
man rights violations. Finally, I will present, in an ideal-typical way, three main 
features of modern societies, especially of modern post-dictatorial and post- 
-totalitarian societies, life-worlds which, in the light of my hypothesis, influence 
approaches toward the past and are responsible for the absence of popular inter-
est in critical debate about it. 
2. There are several questions about the concepts of emancipation and matur-
ity, as well as several important propositions that concern the reading of Kant’s 
notion of emancipation with respect to gross human rights violations and the 
truth about them. Both the concepts of maturity and emancipation with regard to 
an individual within a social system and the characteristics of the social system 
were used by Kant’s interpreters, especially by Critical Theory representatives.  
First and most commonly, Kant was read as having pointed toward the end 
of the immaturity that was brought about by the democratic revolution, at least 
as a matter of principle, but also because of its quite practical characteristics. 
Thus, somewhat obviously, democracy not only brings self-governance and 
therefore requires self-responsibility in citizens, but it also opens new areas of 
discourse and deliberation on topics that were excluded from public discourse 
by oppressive regimes before democratization started. Democratization, there-
fore, at least in principle supports the reckoning of past atrocities by the new 
democratic societies. One can cite here many examples from different regions of 
the world that corroborate this proposition, from German debates and reckoning 
of the Nazi past, to Polish debates on the atrocious events during World War II 
and after it, concealed until the democratic break-through of 1989. In Poland 
such issues, initially silenced and then debated after democratization, include the 
killing of Jews by their neighbors, mass-scale resettlements of ethnic minorities 
by the communist authorities, the nationalization of private property that took 
the form of looting and plundering “class enemies”. In other parts of the world, 
democratization brought about the disclosure of atrocities committed by military 
regimes in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, and of the opera-
tion and organization of apartheid in South Africa. In all of these countries their 
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societies were faced with the horrors of oppressive regimes and started to pub-
licly debate mass human rights violations as part and parcel of the democratiza-
tion process. However, as I will try to demonstrate, the relationship between 
democracy, maturity, and emancipation with respect to past gross human rights 
violations is not easy or simple. 
The second reading presents the later Marxist critique of Kant’s view. It was 
also strongly supported and elaborated by the first generation of Critical Theory 
proponents, i.e., the first generation of representatives of the Frankfurt School. It 
was this critique that suggested that, in the way it occurs, the advent of political 
modernity, the bourgeois revolution, had resulted in an illusion, in a false eman-
cipation that brought about a new kind of immaturity and serfdom. In the light 
of this reading of the emancipation proposition, in order to reach a state of ma-
turity one would have to move from political emancipation to human emancipa-
tion understood as emancipation from capitalism. According to this interpreta-
tion, not only are horrors committed because of capitalism, but public debate 
about them is impossible unless societies are emancipated from capitalism. This 
is not a reading that is of particular relevance to this paper or to the issues of 
reckoning the truth about the past in the contemporary world, and so it is only 
briefly mentioned here. As we now know, emancipation from capitalism brings 
neither human emancipation nor maturity, and even less public debate about 
horrors. However, such a reading suggests other important theoretical proposi-
tions that concern the technocratic “system” of modern society, capitalist or not. 
It is described by Vaclav Havel as an impersonal system that makes marionettes 
of its functionaries and “ritual flunkies” of citizens who shout slogans without 
considering their meaning, who thoughtlessly conform to systemic requirements, 
and who avoid asking difficult questions (Vaclav Havel, The Power of the Pow-
erless, cited above, p. 34). Such a system, thanks to its technocratic structures on 
the one hand, and to rituals on the other, penetrates all spheres of social life. It 
deprives people of their individual responsibility and therefore keeps them in 
a state of immaturity. This line of reasoning, characteristic also of the second 
generation of the Frankfurt School, results in the argument about the rise of 
totalitarianism in “administering an administered society”, and in the conception 
of the “escape from freedom”, both referred to by Theodore Adorno. Above all, 
however, this line of argumentation – with respect to the public sphere and so-
cial life-worlds – was fully developed by Jüergen Habermas in his works on the 
systematic distortion of both the life-worlds and the public sphere, and on the 
emerging “new untransparency” that resulted from the elimination of social 
conflict, characteristic of late capitalism and the modern welfare state (Haber-
mas, 1986, p. 23). With regard to these new developments, Habermas formu-
lated his theory on the emancipatory potential of free, unconstrained communi-
cation, both on the individual as well as on the public level (Habermas, 1981). 
For a debate on the reckoning of the past and the protection of the right to truth, 
Habermas’s theory provides a model of critical analysis, and a normative model 
of transformation: one can compare the existing phenomena and institutional 
A SOCIOLOGICAL COMMENT ON KANT’S CONCEPT OF MATURITY IN THE CONTEXT... 
 
285 
arrangements with the model of free and unconstrained communication in order 
to explain distortions and to postulate the direction of change. 
3. There are also several important hypothetical supplements to an argument 
on the emancipatory potential of free, unconstrained communication about gross 
human rights violation. The first of them could be summarized in the proposi-
tion that maturity, and above all emancipation, represents no definite point in 
history, but consists in a constant process of learning. This supplement is based 
on Michael Foucault’s famous criticism of the Kantian concept of Enlighten-
ment. Apart from this author’s contribution to the concept of power and his 
conceptualization of the ‘power-chain’ that exists – because of unequal knowl-
edge and also perhaps because of rhetorical skills – even in the simplest com-
municative relationship, Foucault’s interpretation of Kant in his famous essay 
places emphasis on the word ‘exit’. If the Enlightenment is an exit from self-
incurred immaturity, then it is neither an antecedent nor a subsequent state; it is 
an intermediate state, the moment of leaving (Foucault, 1986, p. 48). Thus, there 
is no accomplished new phase or state, one of emancipation, after leaving imma-
turity, exiting from it, just as there is no prescribed state of maturity. Emancipa-
tion is rather an ongoing demand, an exigency; in Foucault’s proposition, it is an 
ethos that consists in exiting, “opting out”, leaving the status quo in the constant, 
disinterested, purposeless, and autothelic development of one’s authenticity. 
There is no place in this short paper for a critical debate on this conceptualiza-
tion of exit and authenticity, but one certainly may add that reckoning past 
atrocities gives a direction to such an ‘exit’ from existing truths. We at least 
know what to avoid and we can repeat the slogan “never again”, knowing exactly 
what it is that cannot be repeated: ‘Auschwitz’ and the ‘gulags’. 
The second supplement concerns the notion of transparency and propositions 
that concern the universally valid results of reasoning or, in this case, propositions 
and postulates on the universally valid results of unconstrained and free communi-
cation. As we already know, debates about past human rights violations reveal 
local experiences and perspectives; above all, however, they reveal social memo-
ries which it is not always possible to translate into the perspectives of others, 
especially of those who do not possess those memories. Therefore, the process of 
emancipation based on the reckoning of past human rights violations is locally 
embedded. Moreover, it is based on truths and interpretations of facts that do not 
always have universal validity: they can be partial, subjective, and incomplete. 
These truths are not entirely transparent, they are neither the result of scientific 
experiments, nor are they subordinated to the rules of formal logic. They are ex-
pressed not only for the sake of the truth, but are somehow related to their conse-
quences, and in this they have a performative function. They are social, political 
and legal truths that are based on some rules regulating input, and, as was stressed 
above, they remain in a performative relationship with their outputs. Moreover, 
they could lead to self-assessment, shame, and feelings of guilt on the part of the 
individual, and to political compromise, reconciliation, and the rule of law, pun-
ishment for crimes, and reparations on the part of the political system. 
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The third supplement concerns also our memory of past events. It is obvious 
that no one of us could survive with the memory of all that we might have re-
membered. This would mean an overload. If we do register something, we re-
member only a fragment. It is also obvious that we are highly selective in what 
we see, in what we store, in what we recall, and in how we recall it. What is 
a heroic act for an underground opposition member could be a disturbance or 
a nuisance to those who prefer to live in peace. We perceive selectively, we 
remember selectively, and we recall selectively. We construct, but above all we 
interpret.  
With respect to truths based on memory, the following recollection of 
a prominent Norwegian criminologist illustrates the above trivialities. 
“I was a child in an occupied country during World War II, writes Niels Christie. I did 
the usual things. (...) Nevertheless, I cannot remember anything about the time that the 
Jews were deported; I cannot remember one single comment about it in my generally pa-
triotic circles. The Jews were apprehended by the ordinary Norwegian police. Since they 
were so many and yet so few, one hundred ordinary taxis were used to transport them to 
the ship that brought them to Germany. I suppose the drivers soon forgot this episode in 
their lives. When the few survivors came home from the camps, they came to a country 
that to some extent had forgotten that they had ever been there. And their property was 
mostly gone. It was not until 1996 that they – or mostly their children and grandchildren – 
get a decent compensation” (Christie, 2003, p. 338). 
One can quote similar Polish acknowledgments, both of ordinary people and 
of intellectuals, not only about the Holocaust, but also about events after World 
War II, for instance about the displacement of whole ethnic minorities and the 
confiscation of their property (i.e., its nationalization and immediate selling out 
for nearly nothing to new owners). One can hear the denials of those events, the 
accusations of the displaced people of being enemies of the Polish nation, in 
accord with the line of the official communist propaganda, but one can also trace 
some feelings of guilt and shame (Skąpska, 2005, p. 219).  
Such examples clearly illustrate that social truths, especially if they concern 
the past and are based on memory, are complex and unclear: they are either 
founded on fragmentary information about indisputable facts that can be proved, 
or they consist mostly of interpretations of those facts. These interpretations are 
linked with the place in society, with particular perspectives and definitions of 
situations, with particular experiences of ordinary people, and with social 
memories that are incomplete and selective. Moreover, social truths are based on 
social beliefs, and if they refer to atrocities, to human rights violations, they are 
entangled with strong emotions and traumas. Therefore, they are not value-
neutral. Various such social truths can be illustrated in a series of statements that 
concern indisputable facts. This is documented in an analysis of Polish Parlia-
mentary debates on the possible regulations concerning the “lustration”, the 
screening of the past, and decommunization, the banning of former communist 
from some official functions. That analysis revealed many conflicting truths 
about the political past of one and the same society (Łoś, 1995, p. 192). 
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One can quote many such examples of various truths, presented by victims 
and perpetrators. My own experience in the Polish court was with victims – two 
elderly ladies and one elderly man, all three former members of the Polish un-
derground army fighting against the Nazis during World War II, denounced as 
western spies by the new communist authorities, put in prison, and severely 
tortured. Their perpetrator, Adam Humer, also of advanced age at the time of the 
trial, treated the victims – witnesses in his trial – with the utmost scorn and con-
tempt. He did not question the facts and he remembered very well his own 
power over his victims, and their weakness. Perhaps he also remembered other 
cases in which victims who could not withstand tortures broke down and prom-
ised to collaborate with the communist secret police. He felt entirely justified by 
the ideology of class struggle; for him all three present in that trial and other 
victims of his were representatives of the enemy – western capitalism or ‘impe-
rialism’ – as he constantly repeated. He, on the other hand, defended “social 
justice”. 
Perpetrators of this type see themselves as servants of the state, most often of 
national states surrounded by aggressors. Or they are just functionaries, as 
Eichmann in his office. Or they see themselves as soldiers in an inevitable and 
just war. Their trials do not change their self-assessment, but at least they inevi-
tably lead to public education, public debate about the revealed facts, and more 
importantly, they contribute to a new interpretation of those facts.  
Thus, as this short argument illustrates, social truths – meaningful interpreta-
tions of facts – are based on particular beliefs, and these beliefs in turn reflect 
the social knowledge and position of their holders within the social space. On 
the input side, the truths are based on beliefs and convictions, however incom-
plete, unclear, stereotypical, or ideological. On the output side, they are linked 
with desired consequences. Moreover, according to the psychological concept of 
social truths, on the output side they are also connected with emotions of self-
assessment, which include pride as well as guilt and shame. Therefore, social 
truths are not only fragmentary and complex, multidimensional and contextual-
ized, but, because of the emotions they provoke, they are also ‘rich’ and in 
a way ‘hot’ (Taylor, 1985, p. 35). As such, they are very far from the Kantian 
results of pure reasoning. They are expressed in ordinary, colloquial language, 
and by referring to such notions as guilt, crime, punishment, genocide, and rec-
onciliation, they strongly appeal to cultural and even religious stereotypes and 
archetypes (Skąpska, 2002, p. 208).  
The challenge to social truths, for instance in the form of information about 
atrocities, does not impair the authority of the facts to which these truths refer. It 
is rather an encompassing challenge to popular definitions of situations, as well 
as to emotions on which self-assessment is based: such a challenge could sup-
port pride, but it could also result in shame and provoke feelings of guilt. Hence 
the transformative potential of truths about past human rights violations. They 
make one reconsider the beliefs on which self-esteem is based, they might pro-
voke shame and perhaps also feelings of guilt, and in any case they lead to 
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a redefinition of the situation, they result in a ‘change of perspective’. Therefore, 
the truth about past atrocities made public, debated, and eventually put on trial 
functions as a catalyst and as an important moral impulse for a society to rethink 
the beliefs on which its self-assessment is based. 
The second and the third supplements also point to the argument that there 
are important extra-cognitive aspects of free democratic communication about 
past atrocities. The aforementioned sense of responsibility for the future, the will 
to avoid gulags and Auschwitz, and the deep democratic conviction to protect 
the dignity of victims and involve them in public communication. 
Thus, although social truths are complex, fragmentary, and sometimes en-
tangled in various conflicting interpretations, debate about them reveals un-
known facts and the even unthinkable interpretations, which might eventually 
lead to emancipation and contribute to maturity: a complex process in the focus 
of many social science interests. 
4. Social psychologists apply the concepts of maturity and emancipation to 
human cognitive and emotional development. Among other things, maturity 
consists of an ability to question, to deliberate about existing truths, to eman-
cipate oneself from truths that cannot be accounted for, and also, to evaluate 
critically social relations and institutions that are rooted in lies. It also consists 
in the development of a self that is not only intellectually or cognitively 
autonomous, but also emotionally autonomous, and in the ability to develop 
feelings such as guilt, shame, and compassion (Kohlberg, Levine, Hewer, 
1983, p. 23 ff.). The concept of maturity is also applied to the characteristics 
of social conditions that promote or impede individual cognitive and ethical 
development. In this regard, debate about past human rights violations has 
a transformative and even an emancipatory potential for individuals and col-
lectivities: it can shatter taboos and pull back the curtain on stereotypical 
thinking and collective hypocrisies. For the society at large it presents an op-
portunity for a large-scale learning process regarding its authentic identity; it 
is linked with people’s ability to adopt a critical stance toward themselves and 
their institutions. Since critical self-evaluation can be a humbling and humili-
ating experience that results in feelings of guilt and shame, a great deal of civil 
courage is demanded of societies undergoing this painful process. This proc-
ess, however, is essential to the development of both social sciences that have 
been twisted by oppressive ideologies, and of social scientists who were im-
plicated in them.  
With regard to maturity and emancipation, social scientists are interested in 
the relations between the victims, perpetrators, and instigators, in techniques of 
silencing the truth, i.e., of distorting social communication, and in the social and 
political effects of unimpeded communication about past atrocities. In their 
view, if societies cherish their self-image at the cost of truth, critical voices are 
silenced, their authors ridiculed, or at best marginalized, and the social order is 
legitimized by myths that support a social structure in which there is no place for 
victims. As the author above quoted observes: 
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“Silence is one of the answers to atrocities. Silence, because there is nobody around to 
listen. Therefore isolation of the victims is one of the major features in social systems 
when illegitimate violence is applied. There is nobody to tell, and there is no end to at-
tempts by oppressors to silence their victims. Nor is there an end to the continuous strug-
gle to break the silence” (Christie, ibidem, p. 339). 
There are several ways of silencing societies and keeping them in immaturity. 
It might happen that the victim’s intellectual need for an explanation is eventually 
directed toward his or her own deficiencies and silences the protests. In her essay 
about the gulags, Anne Applebaum describes the extraordinary silence of the vic-
tims of Soviet terror and the phenomenon of shunning persons who returned home 
from the Soviet camps by their professional colleagues, friends, and even families. 
Because the Soviet elite had never quite admitted the wrongdoings, prior to the 
glasnost reform of the 1980s, victims were not allowed even to discuss what had 
happened to them in public. In her words “…silence was mandatory and repres-
sion (of these persons – G.S.) obligatory” (Applebaum, 2002, p. 18; see also 
2004). To change this, it is essential that the victim comes out of his or her isola-
tion and gains access to an audience that will not reinforce the victimization, the 
definition of the situation imposed by the oppressors. Hence the silencing and 
concealment of the truth about past atrocities represents not only an important 
psychological strategy, but also a social and political strategy. The truth about the 
past could devastate not only individuals but also social and national self-
conceptions, and national ideologies and myths. The silencing of past atrocities 
can also be an object of vested political interests. Reports about past gross human 
rights violations and publicized trials of perpetrators and instigators shatter such 
myths and ideologies and reveal vested interests in past attempts at concealment. 
We are dealing here with events that potentially contribute to public debate and 
public education.  
The concepts of maturity and emancipation in the context of past human 
rights violations reckoning are also debated by the political sciences, especially 
if they are interested in legitimizing the newly emerging power relations. As it 
was stressed, the experience of postcommunist societies in Central and Eastern 
Europe shows that the process of dealing with the past follows the rules of 
power and selectiveness (Reinprecht, 2002, p. 103). The legitimization of the 
new state of affairs is desired by policies that pertain to past public discourse, 
and a novel topography of collective memory is generated by new policies of 
symbolism. On one hand, this helps to construct, or to reconstruct, a collective 
identity, and, on the other, it legitimizes the newly constructed political and 
legal institutions that deal with the past, institutions of amnesty and forgetting, 
or of purifying, labeling, and remembering.  
5. Finally, sociologists point to several phenomena that characterize the life-
worlds of late modern society that represent a striking ‘elective affinity’ to 
Habermas’s ‘new untransparency’ proposition, impeding any public debate on 
past atrocities, that help to avoid difficult topics, to avoid responsibility, not to 
mention feelings of guilt or shame. Such phenomena include consumerism, the 
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‘unbearable lightness of being’ of modern consumers, the specific forms of po-
litical correctness that promote conformity to the main stream of popular opin-
ions, and the peculiar ideology of progressivism that imposes forgetting and is 
combined with a purely utilitarian understanding of politics that is based on 
a calculus of costs and benefits.  
As it has been observed, the culture of consumerism consists in the elevation 
of private well-being and legitimizes the conscious concealment and silencing of 
a difficult past because of the present stage of prosperity, for instance under the 
motto “living well (economically – G.S.) is the best revenge” (Halmay, Schep-
pele, 1997, p. 155). It is based on the clear preference given to the stabilization 
of the economic situation, to a life without responsibility, and to the avoidance 
of the difficult topics of human rights violations or genocide in exchange for the 
present abundance of consumer goods. 
Emancipation and maturity are badly served by those forms of political 
correctness that consist in the principle of not tackling uncomfortable subjects, 
not calling things by their real names, not calling the status quo into question, 
i.e., not challenging social cohesion based on the commonality of opinions. 
This leads to the silencing of uncomfortable voices, of all difficult truths that 
do not fit the main current and, in effect, to the exclusion of trouble-makers 
and their increasing pacification. Moreover, because of concerns with social 
cohesion and the unwillingness to underline points of disagreement, this new 
political correctness results in the denial of the deep divide between supporters 
and opponents of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in the past, based on 
the highly unjust supposition that ‘all of us were smeared’ and profited from 
the former regime. 
Imposed progressivism, ideologies based upon “forgetting about the diffi-
cult past for the sake of future”, and the ideologies of a ‘thick line’ dividing 
the past from the present, especially if they are combined with utilitarian rea-
soning about costs and benefits, eliminate important social experiences and 
their bearers, eliminate from the public realm those who have just grievances 
and the arguments of the victims of rights violations – prisoners of gulags and 
of detention camps, the experiences and arguments of families of disappeared 
persons – as if they had less weight than projects of future well-being. That 
form of progressivistic immaturity has two-fold consequences that are impor-
tant for the transformation of post-totalitarian or post-dictatorial societies. 
First of all, it has political consequences that contribute to the aforementioned 
artificial blurring of differences between supporters of the regime and its op-
ponents, and between perpetrators and their victims. Secondly, it results in 
a peculiar form of democracy that excludes voices and complaints of victims 
of the former regime. 
However, there are contrasting sociological observations on phenomena 
characteristic of contemporary societies struggling to reckon with an atrocious 
past and to protect the dignity of the victims, thus contributing to the processes 
of emancipation and maturity, to the exit from consumerism, political correct-
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ness, and blind progressivism. Thus, as it has been argued, governmental or 
international bodies have seldom divulged how gross human rights violations 
evolved and why, who was responsible for victimization, and what its scope 
was. This task has been mainly undertaken, with all its understandable limita-
tions, by NGO’s – such as Charter 77 in the former Czechoslovakia, or the 
“Memorial” organization in Russia, or the Committee for Defense of Workers 
that existed in the late seventies and early eighties in Poland, or organizations of 
mothers and families of disappeared persons in Latin America – “dedicated 
journalists, and committed researchers to whom so much is owed for fulfilling 
this needed task” (Bassiouni, 1996, p. 11). This list should also include churches 
and civil organizations connected with them, which strongly contributed to re-
verse the policy of concealment. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Applebaum, Anne, Gulag – a History, Anchor Books, 2004.  
Applebaum, Anne, After the Gulag, Review of books by Nancy Adler The Gulag Survi-
vor: Beyond the Soviet System, Transaction, 2002; Catherine Merridale. Night of 
Stone: Death and Memory in Twentieth-Century Russia, Penguin, 2002; Andrei Ar-
tizov, Yuri Sigachev, Vyacheslav Khlopov, Ivan Shevchuk, Reabilitatsiya: Kak Eto 
Bylo, Moscow, International Democracy Foundation, 2002; “The New York Review 
of Books”, October 24, 2002, p. 40–41. 
Bassiouni, M.Ch., Searching for Law and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountabil-
ity, “Law and Contemporary Problems”, Vol. LIX, No. 4, Autumn 1996.  
Bauman, Zygmunt, Postmodern Ethics, Blackwell: Oxford, UK, Cambridge, USA, 1988. 
Christie, Niels, Answers to Atrocities [in:] G. Skąpska, A. Orla-Bukowska, K. Kowalski 
(eds.), The Moral Fabric in Contemporary Societies, Brill: Leiden–Boston 2003.  
Foucault, Michel, What is Enlightenment, Polish trans. Aufklärung i rewolucja, “Collo-
quia Communia”, 1986, No. 4–5. 
Habermas, Juergen, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am 
Main 1981.  
Habermas, Juergen, Die neue Unuebersichtlichkeit, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1985. 
Halmai, Gabor, Kim Lane Scheppele, Living Well is the best Revenge: The Hungarian 
Approach to Judging the Past [in:] A. James Adams (ed.), Transitional Justice and 
the Rule of Law in the New Democracies, University of Notre Dame Press: Notre 
Dame and London 1997. 
Kohlberg, Lawrence, C.H. Levine, A. Hewer, Moral Stages. A Current Formulation and 
Response to Critics, Karger: Basel, 1983.  
Łoś, Maria, Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe, 
“Law and Social Inquiry” 20 (1), 1995. 
Reinprecht, Christopher, The Role of Collective Memory in the Process of Democratiza-
tion: The Austrian Experience [in:] Heinz Pascher, G. Skąpska (eds.), A Work in 
Progress. Social and Political Change in Contemporary Poland and Austria, Univer-
sitas: Krakow, 2001, pp. 101–117. 
Grażyna Skąpska 
 
292 
Skąpska, Grażyna, Moral Definitions of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, “Inter-
national Sociology”, March 2003, Vol. 18(1), pp. 199–218. 
Skąpska, Grażyna, Restitutive Justice, Rule of Law and Constitutional Dilemmas [in:] 
A. Czarnota, W. Sadurski, M. Krygier (eds.), Rethinking the Rule of Law in Post-
Communist Europe: Past Legacies, Institutional Innovations and Constitutional Dis-
courses, CEU University Press: Budapest 2005.  
Taylor, Gabriele, Pride, Shame and Guilt. Emotions of Self-Assessment, Clarendon Press: 
Oxford 1985.  
